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Introduction
Governance mediates the relationships between ecosystem services and human
wellbeing, shaping the degree to which those services alleviate or exacerbate poverty
(Suich et al., 2015). Indeed, the term ecosystem ‘service’ implies service to or for
someone, involving potential trade-offs regarding which services, at whose cost or
benefit, at what scale, from global (e.g. climate regulation) to local (e.g. food security)
and for which social groups (McDermott et al., 2013). The decision-making pro -
cesses that allocate access to ecosystems and ecosystem services are thus inherently
political.
The terms ‘ecosystem governance’ and ‘governance of ecosystem services’
highlight the diversity of services that may be derived from an ecosystem in a way
that the more common sectoral perspective (e.g. forest governance or fisheries
governance) may not. This diversity of services, however, may lead to trade-
offs being experienced between different uses and stakeholders, with ecosystem
governance being concerned with the resolution of trade-offs (Sikor et al., 2014).
One key area of trade-offs explicit in literature is between conservation and liveli -
hood objectives and outcomes. We use this recognition of trade-offs as an organising
framework for the chapter, considering first ecosystem-focused approaches, then
rights-based approaches and lastly, participatory approaches to governance. We then
turn to two overarching areas of concern within the literature, on the relevance
of scale and multiple administrative levels (multi-level governance) and the
importance of informal, or socially embedded, institutions.
For the purpose of this chapter, we consider natural resource governance to be
. . . the norms, institutions, and processes that determine how power and
responsibilities over natural resources are exercised, how decisions are taken
and how citizens – including women, men, youth, indigenous peoples and
local communities – secure access to, participate in, and are impacted by the
management of natural resources.
Campese (2016: 7)
The chapter is informed by a systematic mapping of literature related to govern -
ance of ecosystem services and renewable natural resources for improved wellbeing
and poverty alleviation. Themes emerging from the coding of 872 papers included:
institutions, instruments, power and participation/community-based governance.
We further draw on interviews with 23 projects funded by the Ecosystem Services
for Poverty Alleviation (ESPA) programme, and a workshop with partners from
government and non-government actors across a range of sectors from both North
and South. Our aim is to explore what is known about the nature and performance
of governance arrangements, systems and processes at multiple levels for ecosystem
health and poverty alleviation.
Ecosystem-focused approaches: regulatory vs market-
based approaches to governing access and use
Some ecosystem governance approaches focus primarily on protecting or conserving
ecosystem health. Aimed at reducing the environmental impacts of natural resource
use and/or land-cover change, these are often divided into two main categories
based on whether they focus on ‘carrots’ (market-based incentives for desired
behaviour) or ‘sticks’ (regulatory approaches: command-and-control policies, rules
and regulations) or some combination of the two (Börner et al., 2015). The regu -
latory approach includes legal frameworks, land-use or environmental policies that
control use (e.g. restrictions on the species and size of trees that can be logged,
controls on fishing gear used or seasonal bans for particular species) and enforcement
of these rules and regulations. Protected areas, which restrict natural resource use,
are a regulatory approach applied across the globe. While protected areas can have
benefits for biodiversity and ecosystem services, they have variable implications for
poverty and wellbeing (see Coulthard et al., this volume). Weaknesses in protected
area effectiveness are often linked to their failures to account for human wellbeing
and dependence on ecosystem services from the protected area. The very poor are
often disproportionately affected by restrictions over access to natural resources,
through protected area status or other measures (Bidaud et al., 2017; Bluwstein et
al., 2016; Dawson and Martin, 2015). This exposes them to fines and sanctions if
caught collecting products illegally, which they can ill-afford. For conservation to
succeed, governance structures must support local participation in conservation
initiatives, as seen in the case of Great Apes species conservation (Sandbrook and
Roe, 2012).
Market-based governance initiatives, designed to incentivise sustainability
through the provision of market rewards, have generated considerable debate in
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the literature. Although they provide financial incentives for sustainable use, they
focus primarily on environmental outcomes and the effects on wellbeing are often
not central considerations in their design. Of particular importance, from a poverty
perspective, is the critique that market-based instruments, such as certification or
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes, are neo-liberal tools which further
entrench the existing inequalities of a global capitalist system (see also Menton and
Bennett, this volume). They have widespread implications for power dynamics,
access and equitable participation in governance processes. For example, a review
of the evidence on four certification schemes focused on forests, fair trade and carbon
found that without deliberative efforts to support local access and benefit-sharing,
these schemes tend to favour large-scale and/or high-capacity producers and
reinforce existing market inequalities (McDermott, 2013). Similar effects were found
in a case study of biodiversity offsets in Madagascar, governed by the Business and
Biodiversity Offsets Programme and associated international standards (Bidaud et
al., 2017). Such challenges are also associated with PES, particularly when reliant
on monetisation or marketisation of ecosystem services (Kovacs et al., 2016;
Muradian et al., 2013). With regard to REDD+, researchers have highlighted 
how an excessive focus on ‘technical’ issues related to carbon measurement and
accounting – which lies at the core of performance-based payments for emissions
reductions – obscures power imbalances and favours the interests of external actors
and investors over local communities (Patenaude and Lewis, 2014; Sikor, 2013a).
These findings demonstrate that although market-based type instruments may deliver
on efficiency, they do not necessarily delivery on equity and poverty alleviation
(see also Box 10.1).
To inform the development of an approach that may deliver more equitable
outcomes, Sikor (2013b) argues that three ‘design elements’ are critical for shaping
social justice: scale of implementation, methodology to measure ecosystem services
and the nature of benefits. He finds that ‘safeguards’, such as those associated with
REDD+, are remedial and inadequate to address systemic design issues, for example
that favour external control, commodification of ecosystem services and monetary
benefits over local actors, knowledge and values. Local participation in the design
of such schemes is generally seen as important, as is the need to design schemes
explicitly to generate local benefit (Hejnowicz et al., 2015; Locatelli et al., 2014).
Equity, justice and rights-based approaches
There is growing interest in rights-based approaches to governance where well -
being, equity and rights are central considerations in the design and implementation
of interventions. Research on justice and equity suggests that whatever institutional
approach is pursued for the governance of land and resources, it is critical that it
be situated in a broader understanding of the distribution of power and resources
across multiple social scales (McDermott et al., 2013; Sikor, 2013a; see also Dawson
et al., this volume).
Equity and justice framings can be helpful for both researchers and practitioners
to conceptualise social challenges such as poverty alleviation much more broadly,
by recognising that what is ‘fair’ and ‘just’ is socially contested, that poverty is relative
and its causes and manifestations highly diverse, and that resource conservation 
and poverty alleviation require trade-offs. For example, McDermott et al. (2013)
distinguish between procedural equity, which refers to equity in decision-making
processes; distributive equity, as in equity in the distribution of costs and benefits;
and contextual equity, as in the equity of the overall environmental and socio-
political context. A conservation intervention may invest heavily in procedural equity
by bringing a wide group of stakeholders to the negotiating table, but if stakeholders
vary in their relative capacities and freedoms to defend their interests and values,
this could lead to highly unequal material and non-material outcomes. Many efforts
to alleviate poverty do not explicitly address such trade-offs. Likewise, much research
on the impacts of conservation interventions does not disaggregate social data
adequately to identify precisely who benefits and loses (Daw et al., 2011). For
example, a given governance strategy may raise average incomes (e.g. Liu et al.,
2010), but these gains may serve to make the relatively well-off richer while
excluding the poorest and most vulnerable (e.g. Kovacs et al., 2016; Muradian 
et al., 2013).
The emergence of ‘rights-based’ governance has grown from such conceptual
foundations. While such an approach cannot eliminate all trade-offs, it does attempt
to ensure that all interventions identify and respect the rights of all affected actors.
In the case of Indigenous people, for example, the process of Free, Prior and
Informed Consent (FPIC) is supposed to protect their land and resource rights.
However, there remains lack of clarity about ownership by Indigenous people of
sub-surface minerals and stored forest carbon, and the FPIC process is applied
variably in different sectors (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013).
Participatory and decentralised approaches are widespread
but imperfect
Participatory approaches to natural resource governance encompass a wide range
of strategies aimed at improving the effectiveness and/or equity of ecosystem con -
servation. Such arrangements include community-based natural resource manage -
ment, community-based forest management and community-based conservation,
and collaborative arrangements, with communities working with other actors, such
as government departments or the private sector. The participation of communities
in community-based approaches to natural resource management, however, has
been interpreted and approached differently within initiatives, sometimes involving
no more than communication with local communities without meaningful
devolution of power (Shackleton et al., 2010). Many community-based approaches
are introduced through top-down initiative, while others are rooted in customary
norms and practices. In addition to encouraging the participation of resource users
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in governance, many countries have devolved power and responsibilities from central
to local government. However, a lack of power and resources received by lower
levels of government often constrains their ability to undertake their governance
functions (Larson and Soto, 2008).
There is mixed evidence regarding whether community-based governance
arrangements have a positive effect on ecosystem and poverty alleviation outcomes.
Focusing on forest areas in East Africa and South Asia, Persha et al. (2011) find
that only 27% of 84 cases studied have positive outcomes for both biodiversity and
livelihoods, and that these win-win situations are more likely when local forest
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BOX 10.1 COMBINING REGULATORY AND MARKET-BASED
APPROACHES TO CONSERVE BIODIVERSITY: AT WHAT
COST TO WELLBEING?
The Corridor Ankeniheny-Zahamena (CAZ) protected area in Madagascar
exemplifies the trend towards combining regulatory and market-based
governance instruments, and highlights the challenge of linking improve -
ments in ecosystem services with improved local wellbeing. Recognising that
conserving biodiversity for global benefit may impose costs on local people,
the World Bank prescribes a safeguarding process. Contrary to expectations,
Poudyal et al. (2016) find that the best predictor for people to be identified
as being eligible for safeguard payments is not their likely dependence on 
the forest but rather their socio-political power, with membership of the com -
munity forest association committee being the highest predictor. Compared
with other ways of providing livelihood benefits to park-adjacent populations,
MacKinnon et al. (2017) find safeguards to be the most expensive option
delivering the least funds to the community but, unlike other approaches,
benefiting indivi dual households. Benefits linked to conservation agreements
provide the greatest proportion of funds to the community level (ibid.). Using
hypothetical scenarios, Rakotonarivo et al. (2017) find that a household’s experi -
ence of the reality of the impacts of forest protection affects their willingness
to accept any kind of compensatory activity in exchange for giving up their
rights to clear forest for agriculture. These studies highlight the need to
consider who benefits and who loses from the establishment of a protected
area, and how best to deliver compensatory activities. They also illustrate the
interlinked nature of community-, national- and international-level governance,
as the funds avail able to support communities around CAZ are dependent on
the level of income the government can obtain through REDD+ agreements,
in turn based on calculations of by how much CAZ will reduce shifting culti -
vation and hence carbon emissions.
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users participate in forest rulemaking. Reviewing 165 protected areas around the
world, Oldekop et al. (2016) also find that a win-win relationship between socio-
economic and biodiversity outcomes is more likely where protected areas adopt
co-management and empower local people. In Tanzania, community-based forest
management approaches offer the greatest potential to deliver on both ecosystem
health and poverty alleviation (see Box 10.2).
A lack of baseline information and the challenges of finding counterfactuals make
it very difficult to determine the precise impact of community forest manage-
ment on either forest status or livelihoods. In Madagascar, where 15% of natural
forest is managed in community forests, Rasolofoson et al. (2015) used a match -
ing approach to show that community forest management overall has no apparent
impact on deforestation; however, a reduction in deforestation was found in those
BOX 10.2 COMPARING NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE
SYSTEMS IN TANZANIA
Patenaude and Lewis (2014) compared the impacts on ecosystem services 
and on poverty alleviation of four prominent resource governance systems 
in Tanzania: Community Based Forest Management (CBFM), Joint Forest
Management, Wildlife Management Areas and ngitili enclosures, a traditional
land husbandry technique practised by some Sukuma pastoralists. In com -
paring these approaches, they conclude that ngitili and CBFM are the most
successful in terms of outcomes for ecosystem health and poverty alle -
viation, and attribute this to decisions being made at the local level, with
perceptions of equitable benefit-sharing among community members. Where
decisions are made at other levels a lack of ownership or understanding may
contribute to non-compliance or perhaps inappropriate or ineffective
decisions. The authors stress the benefits of flexibility in institutional arrange -
ments, so that systems reflect the local context and preferences. They
conclude by making four recommendations for REDD+ in Tanzania, which
have resonance for governance of ecosystem services for poverty alleviation
more broadly:
1 A decentralised approach to governance should be adopted that aims
to promote democratisation rather than tasked with reducing govern -
ment expenditure.
2 There must be a commitment for fair benefit distribution.
3 Cooperation between agencies is essential, across programmes (hori -
zontal) and between actors and administrative levels (vertical).
4 Governance structures should build on existing traditional systems, which
would support buy-in by communities and simplify the operation of the
governance system.
community forest sites which do not allow commercial use of forest products. In
terms of household livelihoods, the team found that community forest management
had neither negative nor positive impacts on household livelihoods; however,
households closer to the forest and with higher education levels do obtain significant
benefits (Rasolofoson et al., 2017).
Such findings chime with earlier work by McDermott and Schreckenberg (2009),
which emphasises the need to understand who within communities benefits from
community forestry, finding that it is more likely to generate positive change 
at community level rather than directly benefiting poor and marginalised house -
holds. Understanding who benefits is not just important in contexts of decentral -
isation. For example, interventions to reduce the use of illegal fishing gear on the
Kenyan coast may improve the number of large expensive fish but have a negative
impact on the wellbeing of women who are reliant on selling smaller fish (Abunge
et al., 2013). Although women may have very different expectations of the
outcomes of governance interventions than men (Keane et al., 2016), their per -
spectives are often not considered (see Brown and Fortnam, this volume).
The importance of community-level benefits is highlighted in many studies. In
Tanzania, Gross-Camp (2017) finds that although households in villages partici -
pating in community forestry do not experience significant changes in wellbeing,
they are nevertheless very supportive of the community forestry process, valuing
it as a means of securing the land for the community and protecting it from use
by outsiders. A similar focus on collective goals of securing resources for the future
and aesthetic benefits is an important motivating factor for community participation
in marine protected areas in the Philippines (Chaigneau and Brown, 2016).
One of the challenges of participatory approaches is that governments may be
unwilling to devolve power to communities in a meaningful way, as was found
in a study of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in Tanzania (Bluwstein et al.,
2016). Although ostensibly community-owned, WMAs give limited space for
popular participation in rule-making (Bluwstein et al., 2016). This centralised control
of power and resources is seen in the maintenance of the conservation narrative,
with no alternative land uses being considered over time. This is manifested in
‘territorialization’, the setting of territories and marking of boundaries, where
‘decades of consecutive conservation projects have continuously territorialized the
landscape despite failures in the processes of demarcating, controlling, and managing
con servation interventions’ (Bluwstein and Lund, 2018: 2). The governance
framework and purpose therefore go unchallenged over time.
Centralised control and power are also evident in the lack of downward
accountability of formal structures to communities. This means that local commu -
nities often lack full knowledge and understanding of, and engagement with, what
is going on (Bluwstein et al., 2016; Moyo et al., 2016). In the case of WMAs,
Bluwstein et al. (2016) argue that although villagers can elect and remove repre -
sentatives to the inter-village community-based organisation formed to manage the
WMA, the establishment of this body above the level of village government means
that villagers’ power is undermined. This lack of knowledge and engagement
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encourages resource users to utilise informal institutions rather than, or in com -
bination with, formal structures and systems.
Governance at scale: multi-level and multi-actor
All of the above approaches occur within a context of governance at multiple scales,
involving multiple actors with different, at times conflicting, interests. A multi-
level governance perspective recognises interactions among a complex network of
actors and institutions that go beyond a state-centric interpretation of governance.
Such a perspective recognises the challenge of scale in natural resource governance,
referring in particular to spatial scale, but also to temporal scale and the range of
analysis (Gibson et al., 2000). Scale is challenging because ecosystems may cross
administrative boundaries, provide multiple services (governed by multiple sectors)
and are affected by decisions and actions at multiple administrative levels, from
local to international. This multiplicity of actors, policies, rules and levels suggests
that interactions between actors within and across levels are essential for effective
governance, yet such interactions tend to be piecemeal, often project or activity-
driven and are rarely at a level for sustained and effective integrated governance.
Given this complexity, multi-level governance systems may lack legitimacy in the
eyes of resource users and struggle to deliver on accountability and transparency
of decision making (Termeer et al., 2010).
A multi-scale perspective is ever more critical in the context of globalisation,
where the ‘local’ is increasingly embedded in external flows of materials, capital
(e.g. in the form of remittances), investments and the larger-scale dynamics of
international governance and trade. However, as Zoomers and Otsuki (2017) argue,
too many resource governance interventions have focused their environmental and
social strategies and assessments exclusively at the project or very local level, thereby
missing many of the core drivers of poverty and its long-term alleviation.
Ecosystems tend to be governed through separate natural resource sectors
(forestry, fisheries, environment and water, for example). These often operate in
‘silos’, with only limited cooperation and coordination (Reed et al., 2016). Sectors
have their own cultures, ways of doing things, budgets, objectives and plans. The
requirements of, and constraints on, sectors limit willingness and capacity to
coordinate and cooperate with other sectors and actors. One of the challenges at
the local level is the creation of multiple user groups or committees, sometimes
associated with specific donor-funded projects, calling into question the long-term
sustainability and effectiveness of such structures.
Landscape approaches are a specific type of multi-level governance. Ranging from
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects to Integrated Water Resources
Management and Eco-agriculture, landscape approaches seek to overcome dis -
ciplinary boundaries and reconcile social and environmental agendas (Reed et al.,
2016). In a systematic review of landscape approaches, Reed et al. (2016) argue that
the approach differs from preceding attempts to tackle issues such as poverty
alleviation and biodiversity loss by explicitly acknowledging that it is not possible
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to always satisfy all stakeholders. They identify five elements of effective landscape
approaches: evaluating progress, establishing good governance, evolving away from
panacea solutions, engaging multiple stakeholders and embracing dynamic processes
(Reed et al., 2016: 2544).
International processes, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity or
REDD+ under the UNFCCC, bring different implications for governance at the
local and national levels. Despite concern over the top-down nature of these
initiatives, international processes can open avenues of access to the decision-making
process for local people. For example, the rights of indigenous peoples to FPIC
are often explicitly recognised by international policy documents. While respect
for indigenous rights in REDD+ has been far from perfect, it has in some cases,
served as an avenue for indigenous peoples’ strategy to ‘import power’ to the
UNFCCC and have their rights taken into consideration (Wallbott, 2014).
Informal institutions remain critical for governance of
ecosystem services
Institutions, often referred to as ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990: 3), facilitate access
to decision making and access to resources, and both shape and are shaped by
governance arrangements and outcomes (Ostrom, 1990). Institutions are often
differentiated between formal and informal; or bureaucratic, ‘those formalised
arrangements based on explicit organisational structures, contracts and legal rights,
often introduced by governments or development agencies’ (Cleaver, 2002: 13),
and socially embedded, ‘those based on culture, social organisation and daily
practice institutions’ (ibid.). Common property literature, for example associated
with Elinor Ostrom’s design principles (Ostrom, 1990), has tended to focus on
how institutions can be designed for effective governance of common pool
resources. Alternative perspectives, informed by political ecology and sociological
institutionalism (Nunan et al., 2015), place more emphasis on the importance of
socially embedded institutions, including institutions not necessarily designed for
natural resource governance, such as gendered norms and kinship.
Literature referring to informal, or socially embedded, institutions often focuses
on how institutions mediate livelihoods as well as governance, though governance
and livelihoods are closely connected. Critical Institutionalism highlights the role
of socially embedded institutions and reflects ‘(i) complexity of institutions entwined
in everyday social life; (ii) their historical formation; and (iii) the interplay between
the traditional and the modern, formal and informal arrangements’ (Hall et al., 2014:
73). Cleaver’s (2002) ‘institutional bricolage’ provides further insight into which
institutions matter for natural resource governance and livelihoods by demonstrating
how people piece together new institutions from existing institutions, whether
formal or informal, to gain and maintain access to resources. An example of a Critical
Institutionalism analysis of governance arrangements within inland fisheries, by
Nunan et al. (2015), demonstrates how the composition and function of co-
management structures is affected by power relations, gender relations and norms,
Ecosystem governance 167
and kinship. Such institutions then affect how natural resources are governed and
the outcomes in terms of the level of exploitation. They also affect who benefits:
local people, migrants, men, women and people of different ethnicities.
A key finding in relation to the design and introduction of new institutions for
natural resource governance is that this does not take place in an institutional
vacuum. The existing plethora of formal and informal institutions affects how any
new institutional arrangements are received, shaped and responded to (de Koning,
2014). This means that new institutional arrangements may look quite different
between locations and over time. Furthermore, where new institutional arrange -
ments, such as those related to decentralisation, are not fully implemented or
supported, pre-existing institutions, particularly informal institutions, may remain
important in determining access to resources and making decisions with conse -
quences for the health of ecosystems. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, although Pasture
Users Associations were introduced in 2009, they are not recognised as legitimate
by local herders who operate outside of the governance mandate of those formal
institutions, making their own decisions on where to graze animals and how many
animals to pasture (Isaeva and Shigaeva, 2017). In a similar vein, and informed by
research on institutions and natural resource governance, Patenaude and Lewis
(2014) argue that building new governance structures on existing traditional
systems is important for ensuring buy-in and operational simplicity.
One of the most important institutions determining the extent to which indi -
viduals and communities can control the benefits they derive from ecosystems is
tenure. The ‘bundle of rights’ concept recognises that traditional tenure systems
typically have layered rights to resources, ranging from the right to access a
resource to the right to manage it and exclude others (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).
While over two billion people live in lands held under customary tenure (Alden
Wiley, 2016), only one fifth of these are formally recognised (RRI, 2015). In some
countries, requirements that land must be actively used to be owned can discourage
farmers from practising traditional long-fallow systems which may provide many
ecosystem services (Zwartendijk et al., 2017). Martin et al. (2016) argue that changing
the formal tenure of indigenous territories to enable local control over land use would
help to redress the power imbalance and make relationships more equal.
Conclusions
We conclude that there is no one governance approach that can definitively deliver
on improved ecosystem health and human wellbeing. However, it is clear that the
nature of involvement of resource users, particularly of women and the poor, in
governance arrangements and processes is critical. Involvement, or participation,
must be meaningful – that is, it must be sustained and have influence over decision
making. This has proved far from easy to achieve as such participation challenges
the power of government, the private sector and community members with
greater social status and wealth. Yet, governments, the private sector and wealthier
members of communities must also play a role in natural resource governance.
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From this, we can learn that governance arrangements should be locally specific,
developed and shaped by those involved in the social-ecological system, with
potential to change over time in response to changing circumstances and new infor -
mation. More effective governance for ecosystem health and poverty alleviation
must challenge power relations and power dynamics within and across levels of
governance.
A further conclusion is that much governance of ecosystems remains sectorally
focused, even where ecosystem-based approaches are espoused, with forest
management being mainly concerned with trees and fisheries management with
fish. Ecosystem governance implies a more holistic approach to the governance of
renewable natural resources, one that brings potential trade-offs to the fore and is
concerned with resolving such trade-offs. A step towards such an approach would
be greater cooperation and coordination between actors involved, including
between parts and levels of government. This would also enable movement
towards a more adaptive, responsive approach to governance, more able to respond
to change and new information, as well as to cope with uncertainty.
These lessons are summarised in a set of governance principles outlined in 
Box 10.3. There are multiple examples of sets of natural resource governance
principles (see, for example, Lockwood et al., 2010); however, this set provides a
succinct summary of key points from the chapter.
This portrayal of how governance arrangements and processes need to progress
suggests that there are two key outstanding areas of research: (i) how meaningful
and sustained participation of all stakeholder groups in ecosystem governance,
particularly of more marginalised groups, can be encouraged; and (ii) how greater
coordination of policy and practice within and between administrative levels can
be facilitated. To deliver on more effective and meaningful participation for pro-
poor policy and practice, which also delivers on improved ecosystem health, we
need to understand how the dominance of more powerful actors can be effectively
challenged. This includes attention to government – resource-user relations, and
to investigating how new governance arrangements and approaches can more effect -
ively and appropriately take into account existing institutions, including customary
governance systems. To deliver on greater cooperation and coordination within
and between areas of policy and practice, evidence on the potential incentives and
mechanisms for such practice is needed, with examples of what such cooperation
and coordination might look like.
Finally, there is very little evidence available on the wider governance impacts
from ecosystem governance. The plethora of participatory natural resource govern -
ance initiatives might, for example, be expected to empower people and incentivise
engagement with broader governance systems, with the potential to improve
accountability and planning. Investigation into whether such wider benefits exist,
or how they could be encouraged, is needed. This could strengthen links between
ecosystem governance and other governance systems and embed ecosystem
governance arrangements in wider governance, leading to greater sustainability and
coordination.
BOX 10.3 GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
While the literature reviewed in this chapter highlights the fact that there are
no hard-and-fast rules about which governance arrangements achieve the best
outcomes for ecosystem services and wellbeing in which contexts, there is
widespread agreement that certain principles are important in all cases:
Accountability: Kairu et al. (2018) find that the ‘implementation gap’ between
Kenya’s progressive 2005 Forest Act and Participatory Forest Management on
the ground is in part caused by forest officers having greater upward account -
ability (expressed in their role of forest law enforcers) than downward
accountability as community facilitators.
Participation: Participation of resource users in the governance of ecosystems,
whether through customary or new community-based approaches, can
improve livelihood and ecosystem health outcomes (Patenaude and Lewis,
2014), but must be meaningful and sustained.
Adaptive management: There is increasing understanding that governance
systems must be adaptive, able to cope with often rapid changes in the local
context. For example, the expansion of hydro-power interests in the Himalayan
foothills posed a real challenge to the nascent reciprocal water access agree -
ment being negotiated between the small town of Palampur and upstream
communities (Kovacs et al., 2016).
Information: Several studies highlight the need for good information to
support effective and fair governance. In discussing the uncertain boun -
daries of Tanzania’s Wildlife Management Areas, Bluwstein and Lund (2018:
461) note that ‘the people drawing a map wield great power and can easily
err’. Buytaert et al. (2014) argue that the availability of better and cheaper
technology could potentially give citizens access to data that enable them 
to participate more effectively in decision making (see also Buytaert et al., this
volume).
Capacity-building: Linked to the recognition of the need for adaptive manage -
ment comes the need for ongoing capacity-building. Whether decentralising
resource management to the local level or establishing a reciprocal water
agreement (Kovacs et al., 2016), both community members and staff of
facilitating government or non-government organisations need training to
initiate and support sustainable interventions.
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